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█ Abstract Fodor argues that perceptual representations are a subset of iconic representations, which are 
distinguished from symbolic/discursive representations. Iconic representations are nonconceptual (NCC) 
and they do not support the abilities afforded by concepts. Iconic representations, for example, cannot 
support object individuation. If someone thinks that perception or some of its parts has imagistic NCC, 
they face the following dilemma. Either they will have to accept that this NCC does not allow for object 
individuation, but it represents instead conglomerations of properties and at some stage of visual pro-
cessing it must interface with cognition and its conceptual capacities for the visual objects to be individu-
ated. Or, they will have to hold that the imagistic, NCC of (or, a stage of) perception, allows for object in-
dividuation. I opt for the second thesis because I think there is strong empirical evidence that objects are 
individuated during early vision. I also think that early vision individuates objects by means of, what I had 
previously called nonconceptual perceptual demonstrative reference. I argue, first, why Fodor’s view that 
iconic NCC does not enable object individuation is false. I also argue, contra Fodor, that early vision al-
lows the perception of the cardinality of sets of objects. 
KEYWORDS: Early Vision; Analog Representations; Object Individuation; Arithmetic Cognition; Cardinal-
ity of Sets 
  
█ Riassunto L’individuazione di oggetti mediante il contenuto iconico: come è rappresentata la numerosità 
nella rappresentazione iconica? – Per Fodor le rappresentazioni percettive sono un sottoinsieme delle rap-
presentazioni iconiche, distinte dalle rappresentazioni simbolico/discorsive. Le rappresentazioni iconiche 
sono nonconcettuali e non supportano le abilità richieste dai concetti. Le rappresentazioni iconiche, per 
esempio, non supportano l’individuazione di oggetti. Se si pensa che la percezione o qualche sua parte ab-
bia un contenuto nonconcettuale (NCC) come immagine, si ci si imbatte nel seguente dilemma. O si accetta 
che il NCC non permetta di individuare oggetti, ma che rappresenti conglomerati di proprietà e che (du-
rante il processamento visivo) si interfacci con la cognizione e le sue capacità concettuali, per individuare 
gli oggetti visivi. O si dice che l’immagine, il NCC (o una su stadio), della percezione consenta di indivi-
duare oggetti. Propendo per la seconda tesi, poiché penso che ci sia solida evidenza empirica per cui gli 
oggetti vengono individuati durante le prime fasi della visione, in cui l’individuazione avviene mediante 
quanto definito come riferimento dimostrativo del contenuto nonconcettuale percettivo. Chiarirò le ra-
gioni per cui la concezione di Fodor, per cui il contenuto nonconcettuale iconico non supporta 
l’individuazione di oggetti, è falsa. Inoltre, contra Fodor, sosterrò che le prime fasi della visione permetto-
no la percezione della cardinalità di insiemi di oggetti. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Prime fasi della visione; Rappresentazioni analogiche; Individuazione di oggetti; Cogni-
zione aritmetica; Cardinalità degli insiemi 
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█  1 Introduction 
 
FODOR ARGUES THAT PERCEPTUAL REPRE-
SENTATIONS are a subset of iconic representa-
tions, which are distinguished from symbolic 
or discursive representations.1 Iconic repre-
sentations are nonconceptual because only 
discursive representations can support the 
abilities afforded by concepts, and iconic rep-
resentations, by being non-discursive (which 
means that they have no formally defined 
constituent structure) do not support these 
abilities. Iconic representations, for example, 
lacking discursive structure, cannot support 
object individuation. Individuation requires 
that a representation express predication, 
which in turn presupposes that it allows the 
distinction between terms that contribute to 
the representation of individuals and terms 
that contribute the representation of proper-
ties. Object individuation requires that a rep-
resentation contain terms that refer to indi-
viduals and terms that refer to univer-
sals/properties. Iconic representations do not 
support that distinction because they lack 
formal structure.  
According to Fodor, conceptualization is 
subsuming things under a concept, and a con-
cept is expressed by the predicate of a mental 
representation; conceptualizing and predicat-
ing come down to the same thing.2 This means 
that conceptualization requires the apparatus 
of predication, which, if a representation has, it 
allows object individuation. Thus, the question 
concerning the existence of nonconceptual rep-
resentations amounts to the question whether 
there are mental phenomena in which repre-
sentation and individuation are dissociated. 
Representations that do not support object in-
dividuation are nonconceptual. 
Fodor’s view concerning the iconic, non-
conceptual character of perceptual representa-
tions seems to clash with his earlier views that 
perception is a module that outputs the per-
cept,3 because the formation of the percept 
obviously presupposes that the perceptual sys-
tem has individuated the objects in a visual 
scene. If, object individuation requires the ap-
plication of some concepts and if perception 
has NCC, how could the percept be formed? 
Fodor has an escape route. 
According to Fodor,4 sensory concepts for 
visible properties of objects are embedded 
within the visual system and can be used only 
by it, which is why they are not inferentially 
promiscuous like the concepts in cognition, but 
this is enough to confer perceptual representa-
tions with conceptual capacities that allow ob-
ject individuation. Fodor could argue that dur-
ing processing within the perceptual module 
eventually the concepts embedded in the mod-
ule are applied to the iconic content of percep-
tion to enable object individuation. Note that 
this way out is available to Fodor owing to his 
views of atomistic concepts, which is inter-
twined with his view that the semantics of a 
concept term is exhausted by its reference;5 
there is no space for meanings, modes of 
presentation and other intensional contents. 
If one does not endorse Fodor’s atomistic 
construal of concepts, and also thinks that 
perception or some of its parts has iconic 
NCC, they face the following dilemma. Either 
they will have to accept that this NCC does 
not allow for object individuation, but it rep-
resents instead conglomerations of properties6 
and at some stage of visual processing NCC 
interfaces with cognition and its conceptual 
capacities for the visual objects to be individu-
ated, most likely through the role of attention. 
In this view, early vision has iconic representa-
tional states that have NCC and represent 
complexes of properties. During the concep-
tually modulated late vision the visual objects 
are individuated and identified.  
Or, they will have to hold that the iconic 
NCC of perception allows for object individu-
ation. Burge,7 Crane,8 Haugeland,9 Peacocke,10 
and Raftopoulos11 think that the NCC has a 
rich structure that (re)presents objects and 
their properties. Crane,12 for example, claims 
that even though the NCC of perception does 
not have the structure of judgeable content, it 
still represents a manifold of objects, proper-
ties and events. Peacocke argues that the NCC 
of experience represents things, events, or 
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places and times in a certain way, as having 
certain properties or standing in certain rela-
tions, «also given in a certain way».13 I opt for 
the second thesis because, as I have argued,14 
there is strong empirical evidence that objects 
are individuated during early vision. Early vi-
sion, a stage of visual perception, involves 
states that are iconic and have NCC. In early 
vision objects are referred to and individuated 
by means of what I have called nonconceptual 
perceptual demonstrative reference.  
In this paper, I aim to show, first, why 
Fodor’s view that iconic NCC does not enable 
object individuation is false. I also aim to ex-
plain in which sense iconic content shows 
three as opposed to four giraffes, and why it 
shows three giraffes and not a family of gi-
raffes or an odd number of giraffes.  
 
█  2 Fodor’s argument and its background 
 
Fodor discusses analog and symbolic rep-
resentations, which he calls iconic and discur-
sive representations respectively.15 His analy-
sis attempts to illuminate the nature o these 
representations by relying on the criterion of 
homogeneity to distinguish between them. 
Fodor starts by pointing out that symbolic rep-
resentations are syntactically and semantically 
compositional or structured; they have a dis-
cursive structure. A representation is syntacti-
cally compositional if and only if its syntactic 
analysis is exhaustively determined by the 
grammar of the relevant language together 
with the syntactic analyses of its lexical primi-
tives. A representation is semantically composi-
tional if and only if its semantic interpretation 
is exhaustively determined by its syntax togeth-
er with the semantic interpretations of its lexi-
cal primitives. Having syntactic structure 
means that some parts of the representation are 
constituents and others parts are not; “Φ” is a 
constituent of the representation “Φ(a)” but 
“Φ(” is not a constituent. Thus, discursive 
structures are not homogeneous. Therefore, 
symbolic representations are discursive and can 
be recombined the right sort of way. 
Fodor argues that pictorial and perceptual 
representations are iconic and cannot recom-
bine. Iconic representations have no canonical 
decomposition, in that, although they have 
interpretable parts, they have no formally de-
fined constituent parts because they are ho-
mogeneous. Their compositionality rests on 
the Picture Principle (PP)16 that states that if P 
is a picture of X, then parts of P are pictures of 
parts of X. Carey17 and Kosslyn18 share the 
same view of iconic content. According to the 
former, analog representations are iconic ex-
actly in the sense that their parts represent 
parts of what the representation as a whole 
represents. This means that iconic representa-
tions are homogeneous. By not having discur-
sive structure, iconic representations lack syn-
tactic and semantic structure, since both re-
quire discursive compositionality.  
Since iconic representations satisfy PP and 
are homogeneous, all the parts of a picture are 
among its constituents and, thus, an icon is 
compositional whichever you curve it up, that 
is, no matter how you cut the picture you al-
ways get a picture of something. To appreci-
ate the difference between iconic and discur-
sive representations think of it in the follow-
ing way: any part of the picture of the ocean is 
a picture of a part of the ocean, whereas not 
any part of the discursive representation Φ (a) 
is a representation of a part of what Φ (a) rep-
resents. So perceptual representations being 
pictorial are structurally unlike conceptual 
discursive representations. This entails that 
iconic representations decompose into syntac-
tically and semantically homogeneous parts 
and, thus, have no logical forms.  
Fodor thinks that the contents of percep-
tual states are nonconceptualized.19 The rea-
son is that only discursive representations al-
low the application of the apparatus of predi-
cation, which is required in order for a repre-
sentation to have conceptual content. Iconic 
representations lacking discursive structure do 
not allow predication and are, thus, noncon-
ceptual. Concurrently, by lacking discursive 
structure, perceptual representations do not 
support abilities such as object individuation 
and identification. 
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Joining forces with Quine,20 Fodor argues 
that individuation presupposes the capability 
to quantify over domains and pictorial repre-
sentations do not offer this capability. Thus, 
«there is no right answer to the question 
‘which things (how many things?) does this 
iconic symbol represent».21 Fodor things that 
the lack of the capability to individuate is the 
hallmark of iconic representations that sets 
them apart from symbolic, discursive repre-
sentations, so much that the question about 
whether nonconceptual representations exist 
amounts to the question whether there are 
mental phenomena in which representation 
and individuation are dissociated.  
Fodor understands that this may sound 
counterintuitive and this is why he hastens to 
add that a photograph may show three gi-
raffes in the field, but, he adds, it also shows a 
family of giraffes, an odd number of Granny’s 
favorite creatures, or a number of Granny’s 
favorite creatures, and the picture itself pro-
vides no means to determine which one is the 
correct interpretation. Fodor’s view that per-
ceptual representations, by themselves, cannot 
support object individuation because they 
have NCC and object individuation requires 
some sort of conceptual apparatus has a long 
standing history in the Analytic tradition. The 
idea that object individuation requires more 
than mere perception may be traced back, in 
modern philosophy at least, to Frege and from 
there to Strawson, Evans, and Quine. 
Frege thought that to represent the world 
perception should be complemented with 
something non-perceptual, to wit, the capabil-
ity to understand abstract, structured, propo-
sitional thoughts. Only when perception is 
supplemented with judgments does the repre-
sentation of the world become possible. Frege 
does not seem to argue for this thesis, but 
Strawson, Evans, and Quine do provide such 
arguments. 
Strawson’s holds that reference to objects 
requires more than a description of these ob-
jects, no matter how accurate this description 
might be.22 It requires that one be in a demon-
strative perceptual relation with them. Demon-
strative reference cannot be reduced to descrip-
tions that do not contain indexicals because it is 
essentially contextual. The proposition ex-
pressed by a perceptual belief is not detachable 
from the perceptual context in which is be-
lieved, and cannot be reduced to another belief 
in which some objective content from the per-
spective of a third person is substituted for the 
indexicals that figure in the thought, because 
the belief is tied to an idiosyncratic viewpoint 
of the viewer by making use of the viewer’s 
physical presence and occupation of a certain 
location. Thus, the singular element in the per-
ceptual content «is an occurrent context-
bound application of “that” referring to a non-
repeatable property-instance such as an object 
or event or a trope».23 
According to Strawson, reference to world-
ly objects presupposes a minimum amount of 
constitutive conditions. Without them we 
perceive just bundles of features and the per-
ception of a bundle of features does not neces-
sarily mean perception of a thing that carries 
these features. One may respond to the pres-
ence of certain features that one has encoun-
tered before without being able to single out 
the object as an object that carries these fea-
tures. To be able to refer to particulars, view-
ers should have the conceptual ability to dis-
tinguish between the way things seem to be 
and the way they really are, the conceptual 
ability to distinguish the subject from the 
predicate (which means that a viewer should 
be able to apply sortal concepts). They should 
possess the concept of causality, and they 
should be able to represent spatial relations 
within a spatiotemporal framework. In the ab-
sence of these conceptual capabilities, a percep-
tual experience is not the experience of particu-
lars, individuated objects, but the experience of 
feature-placing universals that represent that 
certain conditions are instantiated somewhere 
in the environment. To pass from the stage of 
pure perception to the stage of experiential rep-
resentation of particulars, the viewer must have 
the conceptual capacity to individuate objects, 
to recognize or re-recognize the objects in a 
visual scene and this presupposes that the 
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viewer apply certain criteria.  
For Evans,24 the representation of particu-
lars in perception or in perceptual beliefs pre-
supposes that someone know which is the ob-
ject to which they refer and can provide a def-
inite description that could individuate this 
object from other objects, determine what 
category the object belongs to, and place it in a 
determined place in space and time. Viewers 
should be able to individuate and categorize 
the object, which means that they can concep-
tualize the reasons that set an object apart 
from others. In addition, they should have 
propositional knowledge of the concepts in-
volved in these capabilities, that is, they must 
know and represent what differentiates an ob-
ject from another, and what makes this object 
to be the object that it is. It follows that per-
ception has a representational content that 
refers to particular objects only if perception is 
related to certain concepts that allow demon-
strative propositional thought that is required 
for an objective perceptual representation.  
Evans, however, endorses two further theses 
that pave the way to a different consideration 
of what perception could do. He introduces the 
notion of “nonconceptual content” even 
though this content cannot secure reference to 
particulars. Evans underlines the role of percep-
tion as a demonstrative act whose content is 
determined within a specified spatio-temporal 
framework. He introduces the idea that per-
ception is inherently “centered”. Evans thinks 
that a perceptual concept F refers through the 
demonstration “That O is F” while one points 
to the object O. A perceptual concept is about 
an object or of some of its properties if the atti-
tudes of the viewer with respect to the contents 
that contain the concept are sensitive in the 
appropriate way to perceptual information 
about O. Evans thinks that this perceptual in-
formation cannot be conceptual because then 
we could not explain how the concept connects 
to the world. Thus, the essential perceptual 
causal relation has as relata the visual objects 
and their properties, and the nonconceptual 
information of the viewer. 
Discussion of reference brings inevitably to 
the fore Quine’s Gavagai problem that pur-
ports to show the indeterminate character of 
translation from a set of speech or mental acts 
of a person.25 Quine’s conclusion is that the 
reference of the terms in an unknown lan-
guage is underdetermined by the set of lin-
guistic expressions, since the observers of the 
behavior of the members of the tribe that use 
the language, even if they possess the entire set 
of the natives’ linguistic expressions, cannot 
know whether “gavagai” that the natives use 
each time they see what the observers perceive 
as a hare refers to the hare or to a set of unde-
tached parts of the hare that always move to-
gether. The observers’ experience cannot set-
tle this issue because each time a hare is pre-
sent so is the set of undetached hare-parts. 
The only way to solve the problem is for the 
observer to have decided beforehand the ap-
plicable ontological framework. 
According to Quine, the determination of 
the ontological framework that fixes the refer-
ents of the terms of mental states is related to 
the possession and application of criteria that 
individuate and categorize objects allowing ob-
ject identification. These criteria are expressed 
in a language and, thus, language possession is a 
necessary condition for reference. Without 
these criteria, Quine’s reification problem,26 
that is, how one passes from the feature-placing 
level of experience to the particular involving 
level of experience, could not be solved. Since 
the expression of the criteria of individuation 
and identification of objects in a language pre-
supposes the existence of existential and uni-
versal quantifiers, the ability to refer to objects 
presupposes a complex logical arsenal.  
Underlying all these views is the thesis that 
in order to individuate an object one must be 
able to refer to it, which, following Russell’s 
principle that one can refer to O only if one 
knows what O is, presupposes that one know 
both what the object is and how it differs from 
other objects. Since at the nonconceptual level 
at which the contents of perceptual represen-
tations reside neither knowledge of an object’s 
identity, nor knowledge of what sets this par-
ticular object apart from others is possible, 
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Fodor’s view that perceptual content does not 
allow object individuation follows naturally. 
To support the claim that iconic represen-
tations do not allow object individuation, 
Fodor says that a picture that depicts a num-
ber of giraffes shows three giraffes, or a family 
of giraffes, or an odd number of giraffes, and 
which one of this is correct is undeterminable. 
His point seems to be that picture parts can-
not fix any referents, which is why they cannot 
individuate the objects in the picture; individ-
uation takes place just in case the parts of the 
representational vehicle refer to elements in 
the represented scene and, hence, if reference 
fails there is no object individuation. What 
does the statement that a picture shows three 
giraffes or a family of giraffes, or an odd num-
ber of giraffes mean? Specifically, what does 
“show” mean? It is intuitive to think that it is 
cashed out in terms of what a viewer of the 
picture sees upon viewing the picture. What 
do viewers see when they observe such a pic-
ture? Do they see three giraffes, or a family of 
giraffes, or an odd number of giraffes?  
When viewers perceive a picture, they 
form a mental perceptual state with some 
NCC. They are in an internal mental state 
whose content is somehow causally related to 
the visual scene through a demonstrative act. 
In examining demonstratives, I do not mean 
to examine the linguistic expressions of the 
form “That X” (or, as Kaplan put it, “dthat + 
[demonstration]”),27 but the mental perceptu-
al state that could be linguistically articulated 
by such demonstrative expressions. Such a 
mental conscious “demonstrative” state oc-
curs when some object is picked up in a visual 
scene and indexed (more about this in the 
next section). Were perceivers asked to report 
what they see, they would reply “that X” 
pointing to the object. To be in that perceptu-
al state, they need not be able to identify X or 
describe it using any concepts; they need not 
even possess the concept “objecthood.” Sup-
pose one perceives a square-shaped object, 
one possesses the concept “square”, and utters 
the perceptual judgment “that is square”. 
When one perceives the square object, the 
natural analogue in the perceptual act of the 
term “that”, which occurs in the linguistic ex-
pression of the demonstrative, is the occur-
rence of the perception itself that constitutes a 
demonstrative reference to the world. Thus, 
the perception of square has the cognitive 
force of “that is square”. 
In view of this, the question can be recast as 
follows. To what does “That” in the perceptual 
experience of the picture with the giraffes refer; 
to three giraffes, to a family of giraffes, or to an 
odd number of giraffes? This relates directly to 
Quine’s extended Gavagai problem. When the 
natives see a scene containing what we would 
call a rabbit, what does their perceptual “That” 
refer to? A whole animal or undetached rabbit 
parts? According to Fodor, and Quine, this 
question cannot be answered because pictorial 
representations do not individuate. 
Since perceptual representations have 
NCC, a perceptual representation of the gi-
raffe-scene cannot have as content a family of 
giraffes or an odd number of giraffes because 
that would presuppose the application of the 
concepts FAMILY, ODD, and GIRAFFES. Fodor, 
of course is aware of that and, therefore, his 
point is that the perceptual content of this 
scene cannot support or evidence any of the 
corresponding perceptual beliefs; it is in this 
sense that this content fails to fix the referents 
of its parts. In addition, the perceptual content 
does not support the belief “there are three 
giraffes” in the picture, since the viewers, lack-
ing the ability to individuate at the level of 
perception, cannot see “Three giraffes”.  
If perceptual contents cannot do this, in 
what sense are objects individuated in percep-
tion? To answer that we should examine the 
way the numerosity of sets could be represent-
ed in the iconic NCC of perception in view of 
the fact that this content does contain sym-
bols. Numbers are symbols and if symbols are 
not available how could numerosity be repre-
sented? This is a pressing problem because if 
viewers can perceptually individuate objects, 
they should be able somehow to represent 
three giraffes, or, equivalently, the perceptual 
state they are in should be able to refer to 
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three giraffes in a nonconceptual, that is, non-
symbolic, manner. Moreover, in order for the 
belief “there are three giraffes” to be preferred 
over the beliefs “there is a family of giraffes”, 
or “there is an odd number of giraffes”, there 
must not be a mechanism that could represent 
in an iconic manner the concepts “family”, or 
“odd number”.  
 
█  3 How are objects individuated in early vi-
sion 
 
In previous work,28 I argued for the follow-
ing theses. First, cognitively driven attention 
or concepts are not necessary for object indi-
viduation. Second, the main burden of parsing 
a scene and selecting discrete objects falls on 
object-centered pre-attentional segmentation 
processes that provide the basis for the per-
ception of objecthood. Third, feature integra-
tion in working memory is not necessary for 
the perception of objects as discrete entities – 
that is, for object individuation. Objects in a 
scene are singled out before any feature en-
codings take place, that is, before any features 
are assigned to the object in working memory. 
Fourth, object identification is not necessary 
for fixing the reference of perceptual demon-
stratives; object individuation is enough to 
single out the demonstrata of perceptual 
demonstratives. I succinctly discuss here ob-
ject-files as important factors in establishing 
the existence of a nonconceptual object indi-
viduation. What follows is partly drawn from 
the discussion of this problem in previous 
work.29 To save space, I do not adduce the 
empirical evidence supporting my claims; the 
reader could find it in my previous work. 
Let me start by discussing “object files”. A 
preattentive segmentation process of the visu-
al objects in a visual scene results in the seg-
mentation of objects from ground. (In fact 
these are the so-called proto-objects that differ 
from objects, but in order not to complicate 
things I will keep referring to objects even. 
Fortunately, this does not affect the argu-
ments presented here). Once objects have 
been segmented, the visual system assigns to 
them visual object indices. This completes the 
process of object individuation, which accord-
ing to Pylyshyn consists of two parts,30 the 
segmentation of the scene in objects, and the 
assignment of visual indices to the segmented 
objects. Object indices allow the visual system 
to follow the objects as they move in space and 
time, and also allow the higher levels of vision, 
after attention focuses on some of them, to 
process further the selected objects by apply-
ing to them various object related cognitive 
processes. The indexing results in the visual 
system opening “object-files” for the segment-
ed objects in a scene. 
The object-centered segmentation pro-
cessing individuates objects in a visual scene 
and creates object-files for the discrete objects 
it parses in a scene. The object-files index ob-
jects as discrete persisting entities. Once an 
object file for a visual object has been opened, 
the object’s properties are stored in it and 
eventually are encoded in working memory. 
The object-centered segmentation processes 
are mainly pre-attentional, which means that 
initially the object file is not created in work-
ing memory, which is why the features that 
are used to individuate the object are not ini-
tially encoded and attached to the object and, 
as a result, can change without threatening the 
object’s identity.  
Echeverri writes that object files are depo-
sitions of information in working memory.31 If 
that were true, object files could not be creat-
ed pre-attentionally and non-conceptually as 
Echeverri intends them, and as Pylyshyn and I 
have argued. The reason is that working 
memory is inseparable from cognitively-
driven attention and the activation of con-
cepts. Echeverri, however, notes that the 
property instances used to open the object 
files are not encoded in working memory.32 
Although object segmentation takes place 
at many levels and may involve semantic in-
formation relying on top-down flow of infor-
mation, the visual system performs in a first 
pass an initial or provisional object segmenta-
tion of a scene, before attentional bottlenecks 
occur. Although features (e.g., color and 
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shape) retrieved by early vision in a data-
driven way may be used for parsing a scene 
and segmenting its objects, which allows 
opening and allocating object-files, the object-
files are allocated and maintained primarily on 
the basis of spatio-temporal information, to 
wit, temporal synchrony or continuity and 
proximity, which in turn is based on infor-
mation pertaining to location, relative posi-
tion, and motion. Individuated objects can be 
parsed and tracked without being identified, 
and even when an object is mis-identified and 
then correctly recognized it is all the time 
deemed to be one and the same object. 
Studies confirm that featural information 
is also used to individuate objects when the 
scene is complex enough, and that feature in-
dividuation (i.e., the perception of features as 
distinct properties of objects without the exer-
cise or possession of concepts) precedes fea-
ture identification (i.e., the application of 
sortals that conceptualize these features).33 To 
the extent that spatio-temporal information is 
retrieved from a scene faster than any other 
featural information, object individuation 
precedes representations that support aware-
ness of all other features. 10-month-old in-
fants, for example, use spatio-temporal infor-
mation to individuate objects but do not use 
featural information, such as shape or color, to 
individuate objects, whereas 12-month-old 
infants do. This may mean that although fea-
ture information is available for other purpos-
es, is not used to individuate objects except 
when spatio-temporal information fails to 
achieve this. It is clear (a) that spatio-temporal 
information retrieved directly from a visual 
scene precedes and overrides feature infor-
mation retrieved directly from the scene, and 
(b) that both sorts of information are used first 
to individuate objects and then to identify ob-
jects. This goes against the view that feature 
perception requires the application of sortals, 
or, equivalently, the view that perception in-
herently involves the exercise of concepts.  
The information on which individuation is 
based does not play the role of the binding pa-
rameter that binds the features observed at 
one location, as spatial information does in 
Campbell’s account,34 but it ensures that a sin-
gle object is being individuated. In other 
words, it provides the object that will eventu-
ally carry the features observed at one location 
rather than binding first the features that are 
found in one location to form the object. Once 
an object has been individuated, it becomes 
the carrier of properties. The properties that 
are first attached to objects are those retrieved 
by early vision from the visual scene. (Early 
vision involves bottom-up, lateral, and top-
down processes that are restricted within the 
visual areas of the brain and do not involve 
any cognitive signals).  
The ways features that are used to individ-
uate objects are combined or bound together 
in order for object individuation to take place 
are determined by processes that reflect a set 
of what were initially called “principles” that 
concern regularities detectable in the behavior 
of solid object in our world; some of these are 
the famous Spelke object principles. Studies 
by Spelke35 support the assumption that in-
fants from the beginning of their life are con-
strained by a number of domain-specific prin-
ciples about material objects and some of their 
properties. These constraints involve atten-
tion biases toward particular inputs and a cer-
tain number of principled predispositions 
constraining the computation of those inputs. 
Among these predispositions are object persis-
tence, and four basic principles (boundness, 
cohesion, rigidity, and no action at a distance).  
Because the retinal image underdetermines 
both the distal object and the percept, percep-
tion would not be feasible if information pro-
cessing in perception was not constrained by 
“assumptions” that substantiated reliable gen-
eralities about the physical world and its ge-
ometry.36 These assumptions function, as it 
were, to fill in the missing information. Most 
computational theories endorse this view, and 
there is evidence that physiological visual 
mechanisms implement such constraints in 
their design, from cells for edge detection to 
mechanisms implementing the epipolar con-
straint. These constraints are “hard-wired” in 
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the visual system. 
Burge calls the constraints “formation 
principles”.37 Wishing to avoid the use of the 
term “principles”, I have called them “opera-
tional constraints”. Echeverri calls them “ob-
ject constraints”.38 One might think that 
these constraints suggest that there is a deep-
ly rooted conceptual framework in percep-
tion and that perception operates using dis-
cursive, doxastic inferences.39 To decide 
whether such constraints entail that percep-
tual processing is depends on concepts, one 
should examine these constraints and deter-
mine their epistemic status. 
The operational constraints allow us to 
lock perceptually onto medium size lumps of 
matter in the world by providing the discrimi-
natory capacities necessary for the individua-
tion and tracking of objects in a nonconceptu-
al way,40 and allow perception to generate per-
ceptual states that present objects in the world 
as cohesive, bounded solids, and as spatio-
temporally continuous entities. These con-
straints can be seen as the rules that guide the 
various grouping principles (that extend and 
occasionally override Gestalt grouping princi-
ples) that the perceptual system uses to segre-
gate objects from ground. 
The processes and the constraints involved 
in indexing or individuating objects by means 
of their spatio-temporal or other transducable 
features are not cognitively accessible. One 
does not “know” or “believe” that an object 
moves in continuous paths, or that it persists 
in time, even though one uses this information 
to index and follow the object. Their role is to 
guide the processes of object individuation by 
combining in appropriate that underlies ob-
ject individuation.  
What, then, about the claim that know-
ledge of objects is needed for the filling in that 
allows the construction of the percept? If the 
operations that effectuate the filling-in are not 
represented in the system but are performed 
by hardwired computational processors, is it 
legitimate to talk about these processors real-
izing some object knowledge in the form of a 
set of rules concerning the physical environ-
ment and its geometry? This depends on what 
one is willing to count as knowledge.  
The constraints function outside con-
sciousness, are not available for introspection, 
and cannot be attributed as acts to the viewer. 
They are not perceptually salient but viewers 
must be “sensitive” to them if they are to be de-
scribed as perceiving the world. They consti-
tute the modus operandi of the perceiver and 
need not be represented in an accessible form 
of “knowledge.” In fact, they may not be states 
of the system. The constraints are not a set of 
rules used by the perceptual system either as 
premises in inferences, or as rules in inferences. 
They consist in operations describable in terms 
of computation principles and which character-
ize the functioning of perception and can be 
used only by perception.  
I have said that the operational constraints 
may not be states of the visual system. They 
could be computational processors and, as 
such, they are not representations or beliefs of 
any form, either implicit or explicit. (Explicit 
beliefs are representations that are activated, 
while implicit beliefs are representation stored 
in long-term memory but not currently activat-
ed.) If the constraints are not states of the sys-
tem, what is the epistemic status of the infor-
mation included in the constraints? One view is 
that by not being states of the system, the oper-
ational constraints do not have any contents; 
they are not semantic or mental entities. To 
think that they are, is a mistake committed by 
cognitive scientists,41 who when dealing with an 
input and an output state that are both con-
tentful mental states, they usually assume that 
the processes that connect them are also mental 
states with representational contents. The pro-
cesses that connect the inputs with the outputs, 
however, are mere causal connections. If this is 
so, the function of the operational constraints 
in perception does not entail that perception is 
guided by “object knowledge”. They are, simp-
ly, combinatorial principles.  
Some philosophers think that such opera-
tional constraints constitute a “tacit knowhow”, 
a term used to denote the information carried 
by states that are built into the system in a way 
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that does not require that the states be repre-
sented in the system.42 This tacit knowhow is 
not represented anywhere in the system and is 
not a kind of knowledge. So, for these philoso-
phers, too, the operational constraints are not 
represented anywhere in the system. 
Other philosophers think that hardwired 
computational processors realize tacit 
knowledge of a particular set of rules: «The 
rules would not have to be explicitly repre-
sented in any representational state of the sys-
tem. Still less would knowledge of the rules be 
realized in a state of the same kind as an atti-
tude state».43 Davis claims that tacit know-
ledge is not realized by attitude states because 
tacit knowledge has two main characteristic. 
First, it is subdoxastic knowledge since it is 
not inferentially integrated with other attitude 
states and exists in special-purpose, separate 
sub-systems. Second, attitude states require 
that the concepts that are part of the states’ 
contents be concepts that are possessed by the 
person who is in these states. The contents of 
tacit states, however, are not conceptualized. 
When persons are in a tacit state, they do not 
have simply by being in that state access to the 
state’s content, as the persons who are in atti-
tude states are. Thus, the operational con-
straints that realize tacit, representational 
knowledge of some regularities are not con-
ceptual representations. 
Irrespective of how on conceives of the in-
formation realized by the operational con-
straints, the constraints are not rules of infer-
ence that the visual system looks-up implicitly 
or explicitly to perform its interstate transfor-
mations, or premises used in such transfor-
mations. Hence, their existence does not entail 
that there is some sort of knowledge that de-
termines or simply affects perceptual pro-
cessing).44 So, in general, the grouping princi-
ples that underlie the operational constraints 
do not constitute cognitive influences on per-
ception, but are considered to be bottom-up 
biases affecting perceptual competitions. 
To summarize the discussion, the percep-
tion of “objecthood” relies on spatio-temporal, 
or, on further feature information (shape, col-
or, orientation, size, and so forth), which allow 
tracking of the spatio-temporal history of the 
object and render its individuation possible, 
but this information is not encoded, that is, 
stored in memory and conceptually represent-
ed. The representation of objects based on 
spatio-temporal or featural information allow 
object individuation and precede representa-
tions based on semantic information that al-
low object identification. The former repre-
sentation allows access to the object for fur-
ther investigation, but it does not encode any 
of its properties. The object is indexed as an 
individual rather than as something that exists 
at a certain location and/or has a certain 
shape and color, although this information is 
used to allocate an object-file to that object.  
Object individuation and the retrieval of 
the transducable features of objects occur in a 
nonconceptual manner since this information 
is retrieved from visual scenes by early vision 
that is conceptually encapsulated. The mech-
anisms of vision that process this information 
induce perceptual states whose NCC consists 
in information about the existence of individ-
uated persisting objects and their shape, size, 
surface properties, orientation, motion, af-
fordances, color, etc. Object individuation 
amounts to perceptual demonstrative refer-
ence,45 which involves indexicals and is essen-
tially contextual. Against Strawson, however, 
perception can refer without having to employ 
the conceptual apparatus of the perceiver. 
How are all these related to whether in an 
iconic representation perceivers see three gi-
raffes and not a family of giraffes, or an odd 
number of giraffes? If perceptual, iconic rep-
resentations allow object individuation and it 
is also true that they have NCC, one is able to 
perceive a visual scene without exercising any 
concepts whatsoever. Hence, one cannot see 
three giraffes because that presupposes the 
possession of the concept “Three”. Similarly, 
someone cannot count up to three giraffes be-
cause at the preconceptual level they do not 
possess the concepts “One”, “Two”, “Three”, 
neither do they possess the concept of addi-
tion. Granting that the iconic, NCC individu-
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ates objects, in what sense does one see three 
giraffes? This depends on the way arithmetic 
facts are handled at a pre-conceptual level and 
the answer lies in how arithmetic facts are reg-
istered in the brain.  
 
█  4 Iconic perceptual representations 
 
In the next section, I shall discuss the ana-
log or iconic nature of perceptual representa-
tions of magnitudes in a visual scene. Howev-
er, a visual scene contains not only magni-
tudes (that is, attributes of objects) but also 
objects that are perceptually represented. As-
suming that the perceptual representation of 
magnitudes is iconic, what about the represen-
tation of objects themselves? Do they induce a 
discrete and symbolic element in the other-
wise iconic perceptual representations? This is 
very important because, as we saw, object in-
dividuation is an essential function of percep-
tion. It is also important because the segmen-
tation of a visual scene into discrete objects 
with attributes introduces a semantic struc-
ture and, if Fodor is right, iconic representa-
tions are not semantically structured. In addi-
tion, what exactly is an iconic representation 
and what is its relation to analog representa-
tions to which I shall refer discussing the per-
ceptual representations of magnitudes. Final-
ly, what is the evidence that early vision in-
volves iconic representations? 
Let me start by discussing the nature of 
iconic representations, the relationship be-
tween analogicity and iconicity, and the evi-
dence supporting the thesis that perception (or 
some part of it) has purely iconic content. Cog-
nitive and perceptual states are held by many to 
be cast in different representational formats, 
namely, digital or symbolic, and analog or icon-
ic formats respectively.46 Among those who 
think that perception (or early vision for those 
of us who think that only early vision is unaf-
fected by concepts and, thus, is a possible can-
didate for having purely iconic or analog states) 
does not have propositionally/symbolically 
structured format but an iconic or analog for-
mat, all parties involved agree that at a mini-
mum perceptual states are iconic and some 
among them go further to argue that in addi-
tion to this iconic format, perceptual states also 
display some of, or all, properties traditionally 
assigned to analog representations. 
Before I discuss iconic representations let 
me say first a few things about symbolic repre-
sentations that contrast with iconic represen-
tations. According to Goodman, a representa-
tion is symbolic or digital if it contains discrete 
symbols, signs that refer through a convention 
(“cat”, for example, refers to the relevant ani-
mal through an agreement of a linguistic 
community). A symbolic notation is discrete 
or differentiated, according to Goodman, if it 
is semantically and syntactically disjoint, as 
opposed to semantically and syntactically 
dense. 47 A representational system or scheme 
is differentiated if «for every two characters K 
and K’ and a mark m that does not actually 
belong both, determination either that m does 
not belong to K or does not belong to K’ is 
theoretically possible».48 Since symbols refer 
only through some convention, any composi-
tion of symbols that is also a (complex) sym-
bol refers through conventions and does not 
bear any other relation to its referendum. 
Consider the symbol/concept “CAT”. “CAT”’s 
structure is that of a simple concatenation of 
less complex symbols that themselves refer 
solely by convention, and, so, no part of “CAT” 
refers to cat body parts or to their features and 
there is no natural correspondence between 
the constituents of the representing symbolic 
structure and the constituents of a cat (its 
body parts and features).  
Some iconic representations are dense, 
continuous, and homogeneous,49 unit fee,50 
and come in information packages,51 a set of 
properties traditionally assigned to analogicity 
(analogtr). A set is dense if between any two 
elements in the set there is always a third ele-
ment; the set of real numbers is dense but the 
set of natural numbers is not because between 
two consecutive natural numbers there is not 
a third number. In the brain, some neurons 
have continuous activation functions, which 
means that the set of the activation values of a 
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neuron is dense. Consider a neuronal assem-
bly that represents red and has continuous ac-
tivation values; “red” is being represented by a 
continuous, dense set of activation values. Or, 
consider a mercury thermometer in which the 
magnitude of mercury represents tempera-
ture. Both the representing magnitude and the 
represented temperature vary continuously 
and are dense. 
Blachowicz52 examines the properties that 
analogtr representations are supposed to have 
and concludes that many analog representa-
tions exhibit all these properties,53 but, except-
ing, “relational identity” they are not neces-
sary for a representation to be analog, which 
means that if a representational scheme satis-
fies relational identity it should be considered 
to be analog despite the fact that it is not con-
tinuous or dense. Reference to a similar condi-
tion for analog representations is found in 
Beck;54 a representation is analog if it mirrors 
(that is, it is isomorphic to, or bears some struc-
ture-preserving relation toward) what it repre-
sents; similarities among the elements in the 
represented domain are mirrored by similari-
ties among the elements in the representational 
scheme. Maley offers a covariational account in 
which a representational medium R of a do-
main Q is analog just in case there is some 
property P of R such that the quantity of P de-
termines Q and as Q increases or decreases by 
an amount d, P increases or decreases as a 
monotonic function of Q + d or Q-d.55  
This demand is further developed by 
Kulvicki.56 Kulvicki argues that analog repre-
sentations are those that bear a certain mirror-
ing relationship to the domain they represent, 
a requirement that may be satisfied by non-
dense representational schemes. Analog repre-
sentations require structure preserving syntac-
tic-semantic links (syntactic refers to the rep-
resenting medium, while semantic refers to 
the represented domain) that result in repre-
sentations with vertically articulated content. 
A representation has a vertically articulated 
content when it represents objects as being P 
but also represents them as being Q, where Q 
is an abstraction from P. A mercury ther-
mometer is such a representation because it 
represents temperatures and when it desig-
nates a certain temperature T1 through the 
measurement of some measured height of the 
mercury, it also represents indefinitely many 
abstractions from T1, that is, other tempera-
tures that correspond to heights that are very 
close to the measured type that, as such can-
not be discriminated from that height.  
In these accounts, the traditional proper-
ties assigned to analog representations are 
dropped and analogicity is defined in terms of 
an appropriate mapping of the representation 
onto the represented domain that captures 
semantical properties and relations in the rep-
resented domain. Thus, the defining character 
of analogicity is the iconic character of the 
representation.  
A way to discriminate between quasi-
pictorial representations and sentential repre-
sentations is offered by Palmer’s distinction 
between notational systems (such as set of 
propositions) and iconic representations ac-
cording to which iconic representations repre-
sent properties and relations intrinsically, 
whereas symbolic systems represent them ex-
trinsically.57 For example, in a symbolic repre-
sentation of an object that is taller than anoth-
er, the relation “taller” must be explicitly rep-
resented by a distinct symbol. Iconic represen-
tations, on the other hand, just show this rela-
tion and do not need to represent it by im-
porting an extrinsic symbol. The reason is that 
in iconic representations «the representing 
relation has the same inherent constraints as 
the represented relation. That is, the logical 
structure required of the representing relation 
is intrinsic to the relation itself rather than 
imposed from outside».58 Extending Palmer’s 
views, one could say that the intrinsic logical 
structure of the representing relations in icon-
ic representations, which mirrors the structure 
of the represented relations entails that all in-
formation in the represented structure is ex-
plicitly shown in the representing structure. 
This is not the case with quasi-linguistic, sen-
tential representations in which the require-
ment that relations be represented extrinsical-
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ly entails that there is a clear distinction be-
tween what is represented explicitly and what 
is represented implicitly, in the sense that 
some sort of inference is needed for that in-
formation to be extracted from the explicitly 
represented information.  
What is the empirical evidence for iconic 
representations in perception? I cannot go in-
to any depth here, so I will say that empirical 
support to the idea that representations in 
perception even though are not literally ar-
rayed in space can be iconic representations of 
spatially arrayed properties comes from our 
knowledge of the topologies involved in per-
ception and their inter-mappings. Recall that a 
representation is iconic if it has an inherent 
structure that maps naturally onto the struc-
ture of the represented entity. The iconic na-
ture of perceptual representations is grounded 
successively in the layout of the retinal cells 
that maps onto the spatial layout of the envi-
ronment, and in the orderly retinotopic map-
ping of the visual world onto the surface of the 
cortex through the retinotopic mapping of the 
surface of the cortex onto the retinal cells. The 
physical layout of the retinal cells and the oth-
er receptors higher in the hierarchy of the 
brain renders registration of information from 
the retinal image iconic. The iconic registra-
tion of the retinal image maps onto represen-
tational states in the brain rendering them in 
turn iconic, and both map onto to visual per-
ceptual representation in experience rendering 
it iconic as well. These mappings are ground-
ed in the mapping of the topology of infor-
mation registration in the retina onto the to-
pology of spatial and featural structures in the 
environment and this results in perceptual 
representations that preserve the spatial and 
featural structure of the scene. Beck argues 
that perception of magnitudes is analog be-
cause it satisfies Weber’s law, which states that 
the ability to discriminate two magnitudes is 
determined by their ratio. As the ratio ap-
proaches 1:1, the ability to discriminate the 
magnitudes decreases.59 
Let us move now to the problem of wheth-
er perception, by individuating objects in a 
visual scene, contains discrete symbols repre-
senting these objects, and of whether percep-
tion qua iconic representation has semantic 
structure in view of the fact that it satisfies PP. 
Quilty-Dunn argues that perception cannot 
have purely iconic nature owing to the fact 
that in parsing and individuating objects in a 
visual scene it uses labels, (pointers or indices) 
which, by their nature, are symbolic compo-
nents, whose presence indicates that percep-
tual representations has some sort of semantic 
structure that allows for a canonical decompo-
sition of perceptual representations into con-
stituents, namely the objects, their properties, 
and relations.60 The representations of objects 
through such labels segment the scene into 
discrete objects, each representation standing 
for a particular individual. This goes against 
Fodor’s view that iconic representation can-
not contain symbols since they have to satisfy 
the PP and, hence, have no semantic structure 
and do not admit of a canonical decomposi-
tion being homogeneous. Thus, iconic repre-
sentations do not come segmented since they 
do not allow for the presence of symbols that 
do the segmenting. It follows that perceptual 
representations are (at best) hybrid since they 
contain both iconic elements that represent 
magnitudes and symbolic elements that repre-
sent objects. 
I think that early vision has purely iconic 
format even though objects are individuated 
and indexed during early vision. This means 
that I have to argue, pace Quilty-Dunn, that 
the segmentation and representation of ob-
jects during early vision does not involve any 
symbolic elements. For lack of space, I only 
sketch an account here. The argument con-
sists of two parts. First, even though early vi-
sion does indeed segment objects and assigns 
to them object files that are addressed through 
pointers or labels, there is nothing conven-
tional involved in this process; the segmenta-
tion and indexing is the result of purely causal 
interactions between light emanating from the 
visual scene and the perceptual system of the 
perceiver without any conceptual involve-
ment. It is, thus, a natural process that estab-
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lishes a natural correspondence between ob-
ject representations in perception and the fea-
tures of environmental objects and there is 
nothing conventional involved in the process. 
Per the definition of symbolic representations, 
object representations in early vision are not 
symbolic but iconic.  
Quilty-Dunn would object that object seg-
mentation requires attention that may be cog-
nitively driven and, thus, involves conceptual 
contents. Quilty-Dunn is wrong, however to 
think that object segmentation during early vi-
sion requires attention. He relies on Treisman’s 
well-known theory,61 which however, has been 
systematically discredited the last twenty years 
or so; the consensus is that the initial object 
segmentation does not require attention.62 
Even if this the case, however, a problem 
remains, namely that the labels or pointers are 
discrete elements in early vision representa-
tions and this goes against the view that iconic 
views are dense and continuous and, thus, 
homogeneous, which is why they satisfy PP. 
Recall that density and homogeneity are the 
demands of the traditional view of analog rep-
resentations. We have seen that in the revised 
view, the only condition that makes a represen-
tation analog is that it satisfy some appropriate 
notion of a mapping principle form the repre-
senting to the represented world. Even if some-
one does not agree that such representations 
should be called analog, they would agree that, 
at a minimum, perception has iconic content 
that meets the mapping requirement. A repre-
sentation can be iconic even if it involves dis-
crete elements provided that these elements are 
mapped in a systematic and natural, non-
conventional way onto elements in the envi-
ronment. Since the deictic pointers associated 
with object files are not conventional, there is 
nothing to bar the conclusion that the repre-
sentations in early vision are iconic despite the 
fact that they involve such pointers.  
Now, however, a new problem emerges. If 
the abovementioned account is correct, how 
about PP that iconic contents satisfy? Does 
the introduction of discrete elements in iconic 
representations undermine PP? And, related-
ly, what about the demand that iconic repre-
sentations have no semantic structure since 
they admit of no canonical decomposition? 
Let me start with the second problem.  
It is an essential characteristic of the iconic 
structure of perceptual representations that it 
does not support logical operations. Logical 
connectives and quantifiers cannot be among 
the analog representational content of percep-
tion, as they can be part of the content of 
propositional states. This can be inferred from 
two facts. First, that there are no logical con-
tradictions in perception (illusions are not log-
ical contradictions), while a proposition 
whose form is p v -p is a logical contradiction. 
Second, from the fact that if one tries to take a 
picture of a situation expressed by a disjunc-
tion, say that O1 is either to the left of O2 or 
to the right of O2, one gets a picture either of 
O1 being to the left of O2, or a picture of O1 
being to the right of O2, depending on the ac-
tual spatial configuration. This, however, is 
not a picture that displays the disjunctive fact 
described above; one cannot analogically ex-
press the fact of the occurrence of a logical 
connective. This is uncontroversial but does it 
entail that perceptual iconic representations 
have no semantic structure?  
Recall, first, that representation is semanti-
cally structured if and only if its semantic in-
terpretation is exhaustively determined by its 
syntax together with the semantic interpreta-
tions of its lexical primitives. Recall, second, 
the brief account of object segmentation of-
fered in section 3. Perception acts so as to in-
dividuate objects in the visual scene by parsing 
them from other objects and by segmenting 
them from the background. It does that by 
demonstratively referring to them. Object in-
dividuation occurs through the processing of 
the object-features (primarily spatio-temporal 
information) even though these features are 
not permanently assigned to the objects. The 
individuated objects are assigned object-files 
that initially contain only transient featural 
information that may change; these files are 
accessed by pointers or labels. It follows that 
the representational states of early vision con-
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sist of objects that have some properties, 
namely those properties used in the process of 
object-individuation. The representations of a 
visual scene in early vision, therefore, repre-
sent a manifold of objects, properties and 
events. One could render this representational 
content in the form of a set of subject-
predicate structures. It follows that perceptual 
iconic representations have a rich semantic 
structure that is similar to the subject-
predicate structure of linguistic representa-
tion, or of all representations. Let me say in 
passing that the compositionality involved is 
not that of concatenative compositionality 
that characterizes symbolic representations 
but that of part-whole structures that involve 
different kinds of restrictions as to what 
counts as a proper part of the representation. 
To give one example of what I mean by part-
whole compositionality, 2-D surfaces are 
composed of edges that, in turn, are composed 
of line-segments. When one perceives in real-
istic conditions a line segment, one sees it as 
part of an edge, which is also a part of a sur-
face, despite the fact that the perceptual sys-
tem constructs first line segments, then edges, 
and then 2-D surfaces. 
This account has repercussions for the PP, 
If iconic perceptual representations have se-
mantic structure, then they have some form of 
canonical decomposition since one cannot 
parse a perceptual representation into arbi-
trary parts and still obtain representational 
parts, which seems to undermine PP. If PP is 
taken literally, it is simply false. A perceptual 
representation cannot be cut into arbitrary 
parts that still represent parts of the visual 
scene. There are some limitations to what 
constitutes a proper part of an image. Not all 
combinations of features could be considered 
genuine parts of the image. Consider, for ex-
ample, the back part of an object and a part of 
the immediate background and combine 
them. In perceptual terms, that is, in terms of 
what is computationally relevant in percep-
tion, it is highly unlikely that this complex part 
of the image is represented by anything in 
perception. In this sense it is not true that any 
part of the representation represents a part of 
the image that the representation represents; 
only parts that are admissible as components 
of perceptual processes are admitted; which 
parts are these is an empirical issue. Thus, the 
Picture Principle holds only for admissible 
parts of the image. Which parts are admissible 
depends on the perceptual system; line-
segments, edges, 2-D surfaces, 3-D bodies, for 
example are all admissible parts, combinations 
like the one discussed before are not. 
 
█  5 Pre-conceptual numerical and arithmetic 
competencies, and iconic perceptual rep-
resentations 
 
Let me say first that in what follows I will 
keep referring to analog representations of 
magnitudes since this is the term used in the 
literature on arithmetic cognition. The reader 
should bear in mind, however, the preceding 
discussion concerning the relation between 
analog and iconic representations and the na-
ture of analogicity. 
Extensive research provides evidence that 
infants have numerical sensitivities regarding 
sets of one, two, or three entities.63 Infants ha-
bituated to sets of two objects, dishabituate 
when shown arrays of one or three objects, 
which shows that infants are sensitive to nu-
merical distinctions. Using the methodology 
of violation of expectancy shows that infants 
may be representing some of the relations be-
tween sets of one, two, and three objects; they 
represent, for example, the relations 1 + 1 = 2 
and 2 – 1 = 1.64 
These findings do not support a unique in-
terpretation of the representations and pro-
cesses underlying infant numerical sensitivi-
ties. There are currently two theories purport-
ing to explain infants’ numerical performance. 
Infants may represent the numerosity of sets, 
that is, they may store symbols corresponding 
to the cardinality of sets of objects (integers), a 
cardinality at which they arrive by means of a 
counting algorithm. This set of theories is 
called Integer-Symbol-Models (ISM). ISM 
hold that the number of items in a set of ob-
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jects is represented by the last item reached 
during the counting process, which is executed 
by means of an accumulator of the kind pro-
posed by Meck and Church.65 The counting 
process results in an abstract symbol for the 
integer corresponding to the last item enu-
merated being stored somewhere in short 
term memory. 
Other theories argue that infants represent 
objects by opening object files, and the process 
at work in the various tasks is the one-to-one 
matching of objects, not a counting algo-
rithm.66 These are the Object-Files-Models 
(OFM), according to which infants build a 
representation or a model of the objects in a 
scene, store it in short term memory, and up-
date the model each time a change occurs. 
The objects are represented in terms of object-
files. A set of two objects is accordingly repre-
sented as “Oi Oj”. This representation stores 
the information that there are two distinct en-
tities that are objects and these are the only 
objects in the scene. When a new array ap-
pears the model is updated. If one object 
shows in the new array, they build a model 
that contains one representation, “Ok”. The 
two models are compared through a process 
that detects a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween object files in the two representations. 
Note that the comparison does not rely on any 
conceptual background since it occurs in pre-
conceptual infants. 
Both theories face problems and research-
ers proposed a compromise: both theories are 
correct, each within its own domain. OFM ex-
plain numerical competence with small (up to 
three or four) numbers, whereas ISM explain 
numerical competence with larger numbers.67 
This theory posits two core systems of num-
ber: one system for representing large approx-
imate numerical magnitudes, and another sys-
tem for precisely representing small numbers 
of objects. The former stores cardinalities, 
whereas the latter opens object files, con-
structs models, and compares them. There are 
challenges for this theory as well. First, if 
counting of numerosities is based on the func-
tion of an accumulator, how are we to explain 
that this accumulator comes on line only with 
sets with numerosity larger than three? Sec-
ond, how can the subitizing68 slope be ex-
plained by a search for one-to-one corre-
spondence between models of the objects in a 
set based on object-files?  
 
█  5.1 Arithmetic capacities and analog or iconic 
representations 
 
We saw that subitizing poses problems for 
the theories purporting to explain infants’ 
numerical capacities. Most studies explain 
subitizing by appealing to inherent structural 
limitation of the processing system, in that the 
human brain can index and track in parallel 
only up to three or four objects by attaching to 
each one an attentional tag that individuates it 
and allows its tracking.69  
Studies in the connectionist paradigm 
show that subitizing could be explained by a 
process of pattern recognition rather than by a 
counting procedure.70 Recognition is imple-
mented as a simple pattern matching proce-
dure that matches a configuration of objects 
to a configuration of objects with known nu-
merosity that is stored in memory. This ex-
plains that the phenomenon is related to the 
ability (a) to recognize a certain configuration 
of a set of objects, (b) to identify the arithmet-
ical magnitude of the set (the cardinality of 
the set), and (c) to compare this magnitude to 
the known magnitude of another set that is 
stored in memory, and not to the ability to 
count fast the objects in a set. Pattern match-
ing does not require concept possession, as ev-
idenced by the fact that animals and infants 
do subitize, and, moreover, applies to pictorial 
representations. This by itself is evidence that 
pictorial representations allow object individ-
uation because subitizing presupposes object 
individuation. 
What about arithmetic capabilities of in-
fants beyond subitazing? We have seen that, 
as OFM theories posit, it is likely that infants’ 
ability to perform successfully in tasks of addi-
tion and subtraction with one to three objects 
is explained by positing that infants construct 
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models of the objects in a scene on the basis of 
object files. However, these tasks involve a 
small number of, up to three or four objects. If 
as I argued, pattern recognition is preferred in 
subitization in which a small number of ob-
jects is present, why should infants not use 
pattern matching in all cases and deploy, in-
stead, the cognitively more costly mechanism 
of opening object files, construct a model of 
the scene, and compare this model with others 
stored in memory for one-to-one correspond-
ence? The answer to that is that the set up of 
the tasks (objects appear and disappear be-
hind screens, time elapses, infants must up-
date information about objects, etc.) renders 
the pattern matching procedure inapplicable. 
This is why object files are employed in such 
arithmetical tasks but not in subitization. For 
the same reason, the function of the accumu-
lator that allows the representation of numer-
osities of larger sets (I will discuss next this 
problem) is interrupted. Counting presuppos-
es sequential and within relatively small-time 
intervals presentation of objects. These condi-
tions are violated in the aforementioned ex-
perimental settings.  
The construction of object files which, as 
we saw, is inextricably related to object indi-
viduation takes place in early vision and is, 
thus, independent of concepts. Since object 
individuation, as I also argued above, is sup-
ported by pictorial/analog representations, 
and since the construction of models of object 
configurations in a visual scene and model 
matching is also supported by pictorial repre-
sentations, as the literature on mental images 
evidences, the arithmetic abilities as explained 
by OFM theories can be accommodated by 
nonconceptual, analog representations. 
Pattern matching and the usage of object 
files to build models of the objects in a visual 
scene could explain arithmetic abilities, in-
cluding the representation of the numerosity 
of sets, within a framework of analog, non-
conceptual representations for sets that num-
ber up to four members. What happens with 
larger sets? Could they be represented by ana-
log, pre-symbolic systems? Given that at a pre-
conceptual level someone does not know any 
arithmetic and does not know the numerals 
and cardinalities, how do they exactly repre-
sent the numerosity of larger sets? Given that 
the concept “number” cannot be applied, how 
is numerosity represented? The possibility of 
using and storing cardinal numbers a symbols 
in memory having been excluded, there is only 
one way this could be achieved, namely by 
corresponding the number of items to magni-
tudes, which are analog representations.  
This brings forth the notion of the accu-
mulator,71 and the explication of its function 
by Galistel and Gelman.72 Thus, it is plausible 
that an accumulator carries out the counting 
procedure. When it comes to sets with larger 
numerosity, there is consensus that humans 
and many animals use a counting procedure 
that is implemented by an accumulator.73 This 
system represents magnitudes that have scalar 
variability; signals that encode these magni-
tudes are noisy, and vary for trial to trial. The 
accumulator presupposes object individua-
tion; one can count things only if one per-
ceives them as different entities and as we saw 
in the previous section, object files index ob-
jects and allow tracking. Thus, the accumula-
tor relies on the operation of the object index-
ing mechanism.  
In general, it seems that a counting proce-
dure that represents magnitudes is present 
from the beginning in more than one species. 
However, when it is more efficient, an organ-
ism employs pattern recognition for comparing 
numerosities overriding the counting proce-
dure. Other times, the organism takes recourse 
to the object files created by the visual system, 
when the rapid pattern matching mechanism 
ceases to function reliably. The object indexing 
system is omnipresent in perception and indi-
viduates objects and in arithmetic tasks involv-
ing a small number of objects, which do not 
overtax the visual system’s capacity for opening 
object files and, thus, the capacity to construct 
models of the scene, object files are used in the 
way described above. With larger sets of ob-
jects, neither pattern matching, nor modeling 
can work. In these cases, the inbuilt counting 
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mechanism comes on-line. 
There is a problem, however, for those 
who wish to defend the view that analog rep-
resentations at the nonconceptual level can 
represent numerosities. Granting that both 
pattern matching mechanisms, and the em-
ployment of object files can be supported by 
analog representations and do not require 
concepts, how could the numerosity of larger 
sets that rely on the counting mechanism be 
nonconceptually represented in an analogical 
format? How could an organism implement 
an analog representation of numerosities?  
To answer this question, Meck and 
Church74 proposed the accumulator model 
and adduced psychological evidence to sup-
port it. In this model, number is represented 
by a physical magnitude that is a function of 
the entities enumerated. In such an analog sys-
tem, the animal or child does not have to learn 
which number a given state of the accumula-
tor represents because it is an analog mecha-
nism in which its state is a direct linear func-
tion of number. According to the model, the 
nervous system has an equivalent to a pulse 
generator that generates activity at a constant 
rate. Each time an entity is encountered in a 
sequence, the pacemaker sends a signal. This 
activity is gated so that energy passes through 
to an accumulator that registers how much 
has been let in (see Figure 1). The magnitude 
in the accumulator at the end of the counting 
sequence is proportional to the number of en-
tities in the sequence, and thus, serves as an 
analog representation of the numerosity of the 
sequence. 
The accumulator is an analog mechanism 
in which each state (the magnitude) is a di-
rect linear function of number. The magni-
tude is not something arbitrary with respect 
to the number that stands as a symbol of it. 
The accumulator links the experience of a 
sequence with a physical variable in the or-
ganism, not with an abstract construction 
whose link to the cardinality of the set of the 
sequence must be independently established 
by some kind of correspondence. The analog 
representation, because of the isomorphism 
between the physical operations applied to 
the representing magnitude and the arith-
metical operations, provides the immediate 
link between the mind and the world. In this 
sense, the analog system provides the content 
that grounds the symbolic representations of 
numbers that will be established later with 
development.  
Experimental studies75 adduce evidence 
that animals and infants use an analog system 
to represent numerosities, that is, that infants 
and animals use magnitudes to stand for nu-
merosities, and not arbitrary symbols. The 
Meck and Church analog system is called a sys-
tem for preverbal counting, since is shows how 
animals and children can count and perform 
elementary arithmetical computations before 
the onset of any symbolic conceptual system.  
Dehaene and Cohen suggest that there are 
two distinct neural pathways that process dif-
ferently arithmetic knowledge, though in most 
normal cases both pathways are active and in-
teract during arithmetic operations.76 One 
route, involving the inferior parietal areas, ac-
 
Figure 1. The accumulator model of Meck and Church. Each time the pacemaker sends a signal, the gates open and 
let it pass through, incrementing the magnitude in the accumulator. Cf. W.H. MECK, R.M. CHURCH, A mode control 
model of counting and timing processes, cit.  
 
  Raftopoulos 
 
60 
counts for quantitative number processing. 
The other, involving a left-laterized corti-
costriatal loop, accounts for rote verbal arith-
metic memory. Dehaene and Cohen proposed 
the “triple-code model” of the cognitive and 
anatomical architectures for arithmetic.77 Ac-
cording to the model, there are three kinds of 
representations of numbers: 
 
(a) A visual code in which numbers are 
represented as identified strings of digits; 
visual form is subserved by bilateral infe-
rior ventral occipitotemporal areas;  
 
(b) An analog quantity or magnitude 
code, subserved by bilateral inferior parie-
tal areas. In this code, numbers are repre-
sented as distributions of activation on an 
oriented number line. This code is in-
volved in semantic knowledge about 
quantities (proximity, smaller or larger 
than, relations for example). In this code, 
numbers are represented in an analog 
form as configurations in space; 
 
(c) A verbal code, localized in left-
hemispheric perisylvanian areas, in which 
numbers are represented as sequences of 
words.  
 
The verbal code provides a verbal symbol 
for the numeral, which is added to the visual 
symbol of the first code. Both the visual and 
verbal form constitute the symbols that stand 
for numerals and function as the representa-
tional vehicles of the numerals in the mind. 
Their initial meaning consists in the represen-
tation involved in the second analogical code, 
which functions both as the initial definition 
of numbers and as the initial number concept, 
which is in effect a figural concept since it re-
lates the number to some spatial configuration 
expressing a magnitude. In due course, the 
concept of number is enriched through the 
relation of each numeral with the other nu-
merals in the structure of arithmetic and, thus, 
acquires content that exceeds the initial spatial 
meaning of the number. 
Judgments about quantitative relations in-
volve the second part that represents numbers 
as magnitudes. When mathematical opera-
tions are performed, these quantities undergo 
semantically meaningful manipulations, and 
the resulting quantity is transferred to the ap-
propriate neural language network for nam-
ing. These suggest the existence of a neural 
network in which numbers are represented in 
an analog way as magnitudes, and not as dis-
crete symbols. This means that the analog rep-
resentation of numbers as magnitudes oper-
ates even with adults that possess numerical 
knowledge. More importantly, however, the 
preceding discussion suggests a way that nu-
merosity can be represented analogically. 
One might object at this juncture that 
even if the analogical accumulator account of 
magnitude representation that I have offered 
is on the right track, the analogical represen-
tation of the number of giraffes in the scene 
presupposes prior conceptualization of the 
giraffes and, so, the relevant representational 
content cannot be NCC but must contain 
conceptual elements because concepts are 
required for object categorization.78 Con-
cepts, however, are not essential for object 
categorization and, thus, some sort of catego-
rization, namely perceptual categorization 
can take place in early vision. Although it is 
true that categorization in language and 
thought requires concepts (how could one 
categorize an animal as a giraffe if one does 
not apply the concept GIRAFFE?) there is an-
other sort of categorization that is purely 
perceptual and it may be achieved even in a 
pure feedforward manner.  
Early vision includes a feed forward sweep 
(FFS) in which signals are transmitted bot-
tom-up. In visual areas (from LGN to FEF) 
FFS lasts for about 100ms. Early vision also 
includes a stage at which lateral and recur-
rent processes that are restricted within the 
visual areas and do not involve signals from 
cognitive centers occur. Recurrent processing 
starts at about 80–100 ms. Lamme calls it lo-
cal recurrent processing (LRP).79 The uncon-
scious FFS extracts high-level information 
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and results in some initial feature detection 
that could lead to categorization, Indeed, a 
confluence of electrophysiological studies80 
and psychophysical studies81 suggest that ear-
ly visual processing can be fast and mainly 
feedforward and may even lead to object cat-
egorization. Potter and colleagues argue that 
early visual processing can be fast and mainly 
feedforward and may even lead to object cat-
egorization, and point out that a possible role 
for such rapid visual categorization, which 
leads to a rapid understanding of the visual 
scene, would be to provide almost immediate 
activation of the relevant concepts, or con-
cept-like analogs, which, in turn, enables 
immediate action when necessary without 
the need for the organism to await for the 
time consuming recurrent processing to rec-
ognize and categorize the objects in the visu-
al scene and, even, acquire conscious aware-
ness of the visual scene. Note, however, that 
the view that perceptual categorization can 
occur in a purely feedforward manner should 
be met with skepticism since we know that 
there very early top-down perceptual (and 
not cognitive) processes even at the latency 
of 60 ms after stimulus onset.82 
Familiarity plays a pivotal role in early 
perceptual categorization. Familiarity, in-
cluding repetition memory, may also affect 
object classification (e.g., whether an image 
portrays an animal or a face), a process that 
occurs in short latencies (95-100 ms and 85-
95 ms after stimulus onset respectively).83 
These effects pose a threat to the CI of early 
vision since they occur relatively early and 
cannot be considered post-sensory. The 
threat would materialize should the classifi-
cation processes either require semantic in-
formation, or require that representations of 
objects in working memory be activated, 
since that would entail conceptual involve-
ment. However, most researchers agree that 
the early classification effects result from the 
feed forward sweep and do not involve se-
mantic information, nor do they require the 
activation of object memories. The main rea-
son for this claim is simple. If they did re-
quire any of these two things, they could not 
be that fast. The brain areas involved are low 
level visual areas (including the front eye 
fields) from V1 to V4,84 and, a bit more up-
stream to posterior IT, and lateral occipital 
complex-LO.85  
The early effects of familiarity may be ex-
plained by invoking contextual associations 
(context spatial relationships) that are stored 
in early sensory areas to form unconscious 
perceptual memories,86 which, when activat-
ed from incoming signals that bear the same 
or similar target-context spatial relationships, 
modify the FFS of neural activity resulting in 
the facilitating effects mentioned above. This 
is not a case of top-down effects on early vi-
sion. The brain areas involved are low level 
visual areas (including the front eye fields) 
from V1 to V4,87 and, a bit more upstream to 
posterior IT, and lateral occipital complex-
LO.88 
The early effects may also be explained by 
invoking configurations of properties of ob-
jects or scenes stored in visual circuits. Neu-
rophysiological research,89 Psychological re-
search,90 and Computation modeling suggest 
that what is stored in early visual areas are 
implicit associations representing fragments 
of objects and shapes (“edge complexes”),91 
as opposed to whole objects and shapes. One 
of the reasons that researchers hold that it is 
object and shape fragments that are used in 
rapid classifications instead of hole objects 
and shapes is this; if these associations affect 
figure-ground segmentation, in view of the 
fact that figure-ground segmentation occurs 
very early (80-100 ms),92 they must be stored 
in early visual areas (up to V4, LO and poste-
rior IT); early visual areas store object and 
shape fragments that speed up FFS and LRP 
in early vision.  
To summarize, perceptual categorization 
can occur as early as 80-90 ms. after the onset 
of stimuli presented at very brief exposures 
(20 ms.) in the absence of attentional and 
semantic (conceptual) effects. A stimulus is 
categorized, of course, not as a giraffe (for 
that would require the application of the rel-
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evant concept) but as a giraffe-shaped (that 
is, as an object having a specific shape) 3-D 
object. As Block notes,93 perceptual systems 
can mobilize even under very brief stimulus 
presentations body- and shape-attributions 
that are purely perceptual and are grouped in 
a such a manner as to make the kinds that we 
think as natural kinds and which elicit later 
in thought the relevant concepts. 
 
█  6 Concluding discussion 
 
Let us assess the situation. There are three 
ways arithmetic tasks that involve the nu-
merosity of sets of objects can be handled. 
Pattern matching, model building based on 
object files and assessment of one-to-one cor-
respondences between models, and, for larg-
er, numerosities, the analog counting mecha-
nism. All these can occur in an analog man-
ner and do not require the application of 
concepts, which means that the three ways 
are available at the nonconceptual level of 
early vision.  
Let us return to the picture of the three gi-
raffes. Which one of the abovementioned 
mechanisms might be used to determine the 
numerosity of the set of giraffes in the picture? 
The viewer is simply looking at a picture that 
portrays a number of giraffes. The viewer is 
not asked to discriminate between sets of two 
or three items, which excludes the subitizing 
mechanism. The viewer’s reactions are also 
not observed when objects disappear and re-
appear, when they move in continuous or dis-
continuous ways behind screens and so forth, 
and, thus, there is no reason for models of the 
objects in different scenes to be created and 
compared, which means that this mechanism 
is excluded as well. This leaves us with the ac-
cumulator, which as we saw is omnipresent 
and is being used for sets of all sizes, unless 
overridden by the demands of the task at 
hand. It follows that the viewer of the giraffe 
picture assesses the size of the set of animals 
by the magnitude corresponding to the out-
come of the function of the accumulator. This 
occurs at a pre-conceptual level and the ensu-
ing representation is an analog representa-
tions of the number of the animals. 
Since there exists in place a mechanism 
that allows the analogical representation of 
the numerosity of a set of objects, a picture of 
three giraffes gives rise to an analogical rep-
resentation of three giraffes. Of course, being 
at a nonconceptual level, viewers of the pic-
ture do not see what they report (if they pos-
sess the relevant concepts) as three giraffes 
but, rather, a representation with NCC that 
consists in the analogical representation of 
the magnitude “three” applied to the pictori-
al representation of a number of distinct in-
dividuals with a certain size, shape, color, and 
whatever information is represented by the 
states of early vision. 
The same story cannot be told with re-
spect to seeing a family of giraffes or an odd 
number of giraffes. “Family”, “odd”, “num-
ber” are semantic terms and, as such, cannot 
be nonconceptually represented. It follows 
that, since early vision is the first visual stage, 
the analogical, nonconceptual representation 
of “three individuals sized, shaped, colored, 
etc., so and so” takes precedence and, as a 
matter of fact, is the only one that can be 
nonconceptually represented. Based on, or 
grounded in, this representation, further 
conceptually modulated processing in late 
vision may produce states whose contents are 
“a family of giraffes” or an odd number of 
giraffes. Thus, the three representations are 
not equivalent in being equally acceptable 
representations of the giraffe picture as 
Fodor assumes. 
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